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STANDING TO CHALLENGE UNLAWFUL COMPETITION
UNDER THE NATIONAL BANK ACT
Under the characterization of "expanded banking services," national
banks are offering to their customers an increasingly diverse assortment of
traditionally non-banking services such as data processing, travel agency
services, insurance agency services and security brokerage services.' Banks
are entering these areas under authority granted to them by the Comptroller
of the Currency, the chief regulatory officer of the national bank system. 2
This recent expansion of customer services has been frequently challenged by
the established non-banking businesses with which the banks are in competi-
tion. These competitors have brought suits claiming that the banks are acting
illegally, and that the Comptroller has exceeded his authority under the
National Bank Act3
 in authorizing banks to perform these activities. Some
of these suits have been dismissed for lack of standing on the grounds that
the plaintiff possessed no legal right which was violated by the bank's entry
into the plaintiff's type of business. 4 In others, standing has been found on
the grounds that a person has standing to challenge unlawful competition
resulting from activities which the defendant has no legal right to perform. 5
The use of these two theories of standing has resulted in opposite conclusions
in cases which are factually similar, and they have caused considerable con-
fusion and uncertainty concerning the rights of competitors to challenge
alleged violations of the National Bank Act. This comment questions the
validity of applying the present rules of standing to actions under the National
Bank Act and of distinguishing between the two prevailing theories. It is
submitted that Section tO of the Administrative Procedure Act 6 and the recent
I For the bankers' point of view on the propriety of performing new types of services,
see Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A proposal for testing the propriety
of expanding bank services), 85 Bank. L. J. 565 (1968) ; Hock, What is the Banking
Business?, 83 Bank. L. J. 491 (1966).
For arguments for and against the expansion of banks' powers see Hearings on
H.R. 9548 and H.R. 9822 before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Ins. of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) ; Hearings on H.R.
112, H.R. 117, and H.R. 10529 before the Suhcomm. on Bank Supervision and Ins. of
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
2 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), which creates the Bureau of the Comptroller of the Currency
and empowers the Comptroller to administer generally the national banking laws. See also
Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (establishing that rules and regulations
issued by the Comptroller have the force and effect of law and are judicially noticed) ;
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Smith, 56 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1932) (finding that the policy of
national banks, so long as it is lawful, is for the Comptroller to establish, but that, if
otherwise, the court has jurisdiction).
3 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of 5, 12, 18, 19, 28,
31 U.S.C. (1964)).
4 E.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968), decision on
appeal pending, No. 7192, 1st Cir.; Wingate Corp. v. Industrial Nat'I Bank, 288 F. Supp.
49 (D.R.I. 1968), decision on appeal pending, No. 7186, Ist Cir.
.6 E.g., Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1968) ; Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966).
6 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §{ 701-02 (Supp. III 1965-67).
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Supreme Court decision in Flast v. Cohen' provide more meaningful and
reliable tests for determining standing in these cases.
I. THE RECENT CASES
In two recent cases, Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camps and Wingate Corp. v.
Industrial Nat'l Bank,° the courts held that the competitors of national banks
lacked standing to challenge allegedly illegal rulings of the Comptroller and
the competition resulting therefrom. In a third recent case, Saxon v. Georgia
Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents," the court concluded that the competitors
of the banks had such standing.
In Arnold Tours, plaintiffs, travel agencies in Massachusetts, sought a
declaration that rulings of the Comptroller authorizing the South Shore
National Bank to engage in the travel agency business" were illegal because
that business is neither incidental nor necessary to the business of banking.
Under Section 24, Seventh, of the National Bank Act national banks possess "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing."12 Although the National Bank Act contains no provisions for judicial
review of the Comptroller's rulings, plaintiffs argued that they had standing to
challenge unlawful competition under the Act, and also that standing was
provided by Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 13 Section 10
grants judicial review to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute!'" On defendant bank's
7
 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
8
 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968).
9 288 F. Supp. 49 (D.R.I. 1968).
10 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
11 Comptroller's Manual for National Banks 7574 (1963):
Incident to those powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. 24, national banks may
provide travel services for their customers and receive compensation therefore.
Such services may include the sale of trip insurance and the rental of automobiles
as agent for a local rental service. 'In connection therewith, national banks may
advertise, develop, and extend such travel services for the purpose of attracting
customers to the bank.
12 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1964). 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, Second to Sixth (1964) grant cer-
tain general corporate powers to national banks such as the power to have succession, to
make contracts, to sue and be sued, to elect or appoint directors and to prescribe bylaws.
Section 24, Seventh, provides that a national bank shall have power
[t]o exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents,
subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking. . .
12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh, then lists certain express activities which national banks may
lawfully perform, such as negotiating and trading in notes and drafts, receiving deposits.
buying and selling exchange and loaning money on security. The section then places certain
restrictions upon banks relative to trading in investment securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh
(1964).
13 5 U.S.C. §1 701-02 (Supp. III 1965-67).
14	
„ [Elxcept to the extent that—
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (Supp. III 1965-67).
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motion for summary judgment the court held that plaintiffs lacked standing.
The court concluded that for standing plaintiffs must possess a legal
right, derived either from the common law or a statute, to be free from the
challenged competition with the bank:15 Because plaintiffs possessed no such
right the suit was viewed merely as one to enjoin unwanted competition."
An injured competitor has never been granted standing to challenge competi-
tion which is merely unwanted, without further showing that it was in some
way illegaI. 17
 The court added that the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vided no standing because the Act continued the "traditional requirements
of standing," 18
 namely, that for standing plaintiff is required to possess a
legal right deriving either from common law or statute.
In Wingate, plaintiff, a Rhode Island corporation marketing and per-
forming data processing services for the general business public, sued to en-
join the Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island from engaging in the data
processing business. A ruling of the Comptroller authorized national banks to
offer data processing services to other banks and bank customers." Plaintiff
argued that such activities were neither incidental nor necessary to the busi-
ness of banking as required by Section 24, Seventh, of the National Bank Act
and were therefore illegal. Plaintiff claimed standing under Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and contended also that the Bank Service
Corporation Act.8° provided the legal right to be free from competition with
national banks that was necessary for standing. The Bank Service Corporation
Act regulates the establishment and operation of corporations formed by na-
tional banks for the purpose of performing the banks' own data processing
requirements. 21 It was argued that the Act manifested a congressional intent
15 286 F. Supp. at 772.
16
 Id. at 773.
17 See Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968), where the Supreme
Court stated:
This court, it is true, has repeatedly held that the economic injury which results
from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, confer standing on the injured
business to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor's operations. . . .
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) ; Tennessee Power Co. v.
TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). .
18 286 F. Supp. at 772.
19 Comptroller's Manual for National Banks If 3500 (1966):
Incidental to its banking services, a national bank may make available its
data processing equipment or perform data processing services on such equipment
for other banks and bank customers.
29 76 Stat. 1132 (1962), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1964).
21 A bank service corporation is
. . . a corporation organized to perform bank services for two or more banks,
each of which owns part of the capital stock of such corporation, and at least
one of which is subject to examination by a federal supervisory agency.
12 U.S.C: § 1861(c) (1964).
Bank services are defined as
. . • check and deposit sorting and posting, computation and posting of interest
and other credits and charges, preparation and mailing of checks, statements,
notices, and similar items, or any other clerical, bookkeeping, accounting, sta-
tistical, or similar functions performed for a bank.
12 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (1964).
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964) states:
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that the entry of banks into the data processing business be strictly regulated,
and that open competition with existing computer firms was an invasion of
plaintiff's legal rights under the Act. 22 The court held that plaintiff lacked
standing under both statutes. The Administrative Procedure Act was found
not to provide plaintiff with standing because plaintiff was not "adversely
affected or aggrieved" under the National Bank Act since the Act was not
intended to protect plaintiff from competition." Similarly, the court found
no intent to protect plaintiff in the Bank Services Corporation Act.24 Because
of the absence of such intent in either statute plaintiff possessed no legal
right against competition and therefore had no standing to allege unlawful
competition.
In a third recent case the court held that a competitor had standing to
challenge allegedly illegal competition under the National Bank Act. In Saxon
v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents,25
 an association of independent
insurance agents sought both a declaratory judgment that the Comptroller's
ruling allowing national banks to engage in insurance agency activities in
cities of over 5,000 population" was illegal, and an injunction against defend-
ant national bank to prevent it from engaging in such activities. The insurance
agents maintained that Section 92 of the National Bank Act prevented na-
tional banks from acting as insurance agents in cities of over 5,000 population
because the statute specifically allows such activities only in cities where the
population does not exceed 5,000.27 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that section 92 protects insurance agents
from competition with national banks in cities of over 5,000 population, and
that plaintiffs therefore had a legal right to show that the protection afforded
them by section 92 had been violated. 28
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided first that
section 92 prohibited national banks from engaging in the insurance agency
business in cities of over 5,000 population, and that, since defendant bank
was engaged ih such activities, the competition it created with the insurance
agents was unlawful. 28 The court then held that standing existed to challenge
No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the
performance of bank services for banks.
22
 288 F. Supp. at 56.
23
 Id. at 52-53, 56.
24 Id, at 56.
25 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'g Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents v.
Saxon, 260 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
28 Comptroller's Administrative Ruling No. 7110 (1963):
Incidental to the powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. Sections 24 . . . ,
National Banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance of insurance
which is incident to banking transactions. Commissions received therefrom or
service charges imposed therefore may be retained by the bank.
27  	 . [National Banks] in any place the population of which does not exceed
five thousand inhabitants . . . may, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Comptroller . . . , act as the agent for any fire, life or other
insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State . . • to do business
in said State. . .
12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (1964).
28 260 F. Supp. at 804.
20 399 F.2d at 1016.
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the unlawful cornpetition. 3° The court did not first consider whether plaintiffs
possessed a common law or statutory right to be protected from competition;
instead, it looked immediately to the legal authority of the defendant to engage
in the activity. It was held that since the bank lacked the legal right to engage
in insurance agency activities, the insurance agents had standing to enjoin
the unlawful acts.31
The court found also that the insurance agents had a statutory aid to
standing because the legislative history of section 92 manifested a congres-
sional intent to protect them from competition with national banks in cities of
over 5,000 population.32
 The court stated that this statutory aid was in addi-
tion to the agents' legal right to protect themselves from unlawful com-
petition, 33 and thus implied that even without the statutory aid they would
have had standing.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Thornberry disagreed with the majority
that the insurance agents had a statutory aid to standing. He concluded that
section 92 was not intended to protect insurance agents in cities of over 5,000
population from competition with national banks, but was intended only to
strengthen banks in towns of under 5,000 population." He disagreed also
with the emphasis of the majority upon its finding that the bank was violating
section 92. He stated that the court's method of first determining whether
the activity was unlawful, and then discussing standing, implied that plaintiffs'
standing—a procedural matter—somehow depended upon the determination
of the merits of the substantive issue.35 He concluded that it was the allegation
of illegality which gave standing, not the courts ultimate finding of illegality."
He maintained further that, on the basis of the holding in Flast v. Cohen,"
standing should be granted when parties are in a genuine adversary relation-
ship, and that in the instant case plaintiffs had demonstrated a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome to render it a genuine adversary contest."
These three cases illustrate the two predominant theories of standing
that are applied in cases challenging the legality of the Comptroller's rulings
under the National Bank Act and the competition resulting from those rulings.
Both theories start from the same premise, that injury sustained through
business competition, in the absence of additional considerations, is never
sufficient for standing to challenge the competition." In Arno10° and Win-
gate." the courts applied the traditional theory of standing to challenge
competition—that a person has no standing to challenge injurious competition
30 Id. at 1016.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1018.
84 Id. at 1019.
35 Id. at 1020 n.3.
36 Id.
n 7 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
36 399 F.2d at 1021.
$ 9 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. at 772; Wingate Corp. v. Industrial
Nat'l Bank, 288 F. Supp. at 55; Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents v. Saxon, 399
F.2d at 1017.
ao 286 F. Supp. at 772; 288 F. Supp. at 53, 56.
41 288 F. Supp. at 52, 53,
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unless he possesses a legal right, derived either from common law or from
statute, which was violated by the competition. Wingate also illustrates the
additional requirement of the legal right theory which arises when a statutory
right is claimed—that the statute must be intended to protect the challenging
party from competition. 42 In Georgia Association the court was not concerned
whether the plaintiff had a common law or statutory right or whether a rele-
vant statute was intended to protect the plaintiff's competitive interest. The
court determined standing by considering whether the challenged party had
the legal right under a statute to engage in the competitive activities. 43 If no
such right was found to exist the injured competitor had standing to challenge
the illegal competition. 44
These two theories of standing will be examined and their inherent
inapplicability to suits challenging the legality of the Comptroller's rulings
under the National Bank Act and the resulting competition will be shown.
Then more valid methods of determining standing in cases of this type will
be suggested. The first method involves application of Section IQ of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the second the underlying rationale of
the decision in Flast v. Cohen.
II. THE PRESENT TIIEORIES
The legal right theory derives from several cases of which Tennessee
Elec. Power Co. v. TVA 45
 is representative. In Tennessee Electric standing
was denied a private utility company to challenge the constitutionality of
actions by the federal government which resulted in competition with the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court applied the now "traditional" theory of stand-
ing. It reasoned that for standing the injured competitor needed a legal
right, derived from common law or from statute, which was violated by the
alleged illegal competition.46
 Because the Court found that no legal right of
plaintiff was violated by the challenged activity, plaintiff lacked standing.
When a right derived from a statute is alleged as a basis for standing,
as occurs in every case in which the legality of competition is challenged
under the National Bank Act, the courts encounter considerably more diffi-
culty in determining whether a legal right exists than in the relatively simple
cases involving violations of common law rights. This difficulty arises because
the plaintiff has a legal right under a statute only if the statute was intended
to protect him from competition and, in many instances, the intent of a
42 Id. at 52-53, 56.
42 399 F.2d at 1016-17.
44 Id. at 1016.
45 306 U.S. 118 (1939). The line of cases in which it has been held that standing
cannot exist in the absence of a common law or statutory right in the plaintiff dates at
least from 1881. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, I05 U.S. 166 (1881). The theory was further
developed and most frequently applied in several cases arising out of the establishment
by Congress of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Tennessee Dec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938). The most recent
application of the theory was in Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
46 306 U.S. at 137-38, where the Supreme Court deemed it essential to standing that
plaintiff possess
... a legal right, one of property, one arising out of contract, one ... protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.
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statute is extremely difficult to ascertain. When such a congressional intent
is found, plaintiff possesses a "statutory aid" to standing, and standing will
be granted.
A. The Statutory Aid Test
The courts have indicated three steps by which the existence of a con-
gressional intent to protect a plaintiff from competition is determined. The
first step is to examine the language of the statute to determine whether it
indicates an intent to protect the plaintiff, and thus gives him a right to be
free from some or all types of competition. This is frequently the case where
the statute gives the plaintiff a license, franchise or monopoly to operate a
business,41
 and he obtains a right to be free from unlicensed competition.
Possession of such a right gives him standing.
The second step is an examination of a statute's legislative history to
determine whether congress intended to protect the plaintiff from competi-
tion43
 when no clear intent is obvious on the face of the statute. If the legis-
lative history reveals such an intent the court will usually hold that the
plaintiff has a legal right against competition and therefore has standing. In
Georgia Association, for example, the court found an intent to protect insur-
ance agents in cities of over 5,000 population in the congressional hearings
on Section 92 of the National Bank Act.'"
If neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history show an
intent to protect the plaintiff, the third step is to determine whether there is
a general congressional policy to protect the plaintiff from competition. Such
a policy was found to exist in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp5° where the
legality of a Comptroller's ruling authorizing national banks to establish col-
lective investment funds (mutual funds) was challenged. The court found a
congressional policy of segregating the banking and investment businesses,
and from the fact that Congress had consistently kept separate regulatory
statutes for these businesses the court implied an intent to protect investment
brokers from competition with national banks." Thus, it held that the
brokers had standing to challenge the invasion of the investment business by
national banks.s 2
As a principle for determining standing to challenge allegedly illegal
activities under the National Bank Act the statutory aid concept presents
several problems. First, to determine the existence of a congressional intent
to protect the plaintiff from competition, the courts, in most instances, must
examine unreliable sources, such as an often ambiguous legislative history.
For example, in Georgia Association the court was divided on the question
whether Section 92 of the National Bank Act was intended to protect insur-
ance agents. The majority held that their reading of the legislative history
of the bill indicated that section 92 had such an intention.s' Judge Thornberry,
47 E.g., Frost v. Corporation Comm'r, 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
48 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) ,
49 399 F.2d at 1016.
5° 274 F. Stipp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
51 Id. at 636.
52 Id.
58 399 F.2d at 1016.
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on the other hand, disagreed with the majority as to the purpose of the section.
He interpreted the legislative history as indicating a congressional intent to
strengthen banks in small towns "where they needed strengthening," but not
an intent to protect insurance agents in larger towns."
Similarly, in Wingate the court had to determine the purpose of the
Bank Service Corporation Act which regulated the data processing activities
of national banks. Although the court concluded that the Act was not intended
to protect existing data processing firms from competition with banks, 55 the
existence of numerous conflicting and contradictory statements in the legis-
lative history of the Act provides no clear basis for this conclusion. 56 The
court apparently did not consult the legislative history at all" but derived
its conclusion about the intent of the Act from the express terms of the statute.
This was an apparent attempt to avoid interpretation of the confusing legis-
lative history of the Act.
Because the determination of the congressional intent of a statute like
any statutory construction involves an examination of ambiguous and con:
flitting statements in its legislative history, the statutory aid concept is as
unreliable as the sources of the congressional intent. Under the statutory aid
approach the plaintiff's standing frequently depends upon statements in the
legislative history which may have little or no relationship to the actual
purpose of a law or which may have been uttered by parties promoting narrow
private interests. Also, standing is made to depend upon such things as the
completeness of the legislative history or whether there was sufficient interest
in the passage of the statute to produce a thorough debate. Ultimately, under
the statutory aid theory standing depends upon the varied reaction of the
individual judicial mind to evidence gleaned from non-judicial sources. Thus
the statutory aid theory seldom supplies a sound basis for judicial determina-
tion of a person's right to his day in court.
Another difficulty with the statutory aid concept is that it cannot be
applied in cases involving statutes intended to protect the public interest
&I- Id. at 1019.
55 288 F. Supp. at 56.
56 There is sufficient authority in the legislative history by which the court could
have found that the purpose of the Bank Service Corporation Act was to protect the
infant data processing industry from competition with banks, e.g.,
[T]he service corporations' activities could not "include any professional
services of a kind which cannot properly be performed by corporations," that
bank service corporations should not be used as devices or subterfuges to enable
banks to get into nonbank activities... .
108 Cong. Rec. 21312 (1962) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
In most cases, of course, it is expected that the total activity [providing services]
for nonbank organizations would be relatively small, or there would be no non-
bank services.
S. Rep. No. 2105, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3878,
3883 (1962).
The authorization to perform services for others that the owning banks [This
provision was deleted from the final version of the bill.] is provided in order to
permit full and efficient use of the equipment of the bank service corporation.
The bill is not intended to enable banks to engage in nonbank business. .. .
Id. at 3881.
57 288 F. Supp. at 56.
428
STANDING UNDER THE NATIONAL BANK ACT
because under such a statute no individual will be able to show a congres-
sional intent to protect him from competition. The National Bank Act is a
statute intended to protect the public interest in a sound credit system. Thus
the statutory aid approach should not be used to determine standing in illegal
competition cases under the Act.
The legislative history of the National Bank Act indicates that its
immediate purpose was to finance the Civil War by the establishment of a
sound national banking system and the issuance of a stable currency. 58
 It has
since served as the basic regulatory mechanism of the national bank system.
It has been recognized to be in the general public interest to prohibit banks
from engaging in non-banking activities. 55 The public interest lies not in the
prevention of competition with other business, but rather in the prevention
of all of the consequences flowing from unrestrained banking activity which
might endanger bank assets and thereby weaken the banking system. The
National Bank Act clearly protects the public interest by regulating the
activities of national banks.
The result of applying the statutory aid concept to alleged violations
of Section 24, Seventh, of the National Bank Act is that no injured competitor
would have standing to sue for lack of any congressional intent to protect
their particular competitive interest. Under the statutory aid test, section
24, Seventh, is essentially a legal no man's land in which no one apparently has
standing to allege unlawful competition and to compel banks to perform only
those functions which are necessary or incidental to banking. Thus, despite
the probability that Congress never envisioned the travel agency business, for
example, as being necessary or incidental to banking, national banks will
continue conducting these activities, perhaps in violation of Section 24, Seventh,
of the Act."
This result is clearly undesirable because it ignores the broader public
interest in a sound banking system, which would be served if competitors
were granted standing in actions seeking to compel banks to exercise only
those powers granted by the National Bank Act. Furthermore, it is unreason-
able to think that Congress intended the broad outlines provided by section
24, Seventh, to be unenforceable in the courts merely because it legislated in the
public interest. The only reasonable conclusion is that the statutory aid test
58 Special Message—Abraham Lincoln, On Financing the War, S. Jour. 37th Cong.,
3d Sess. 121-22 (1863).
59 7 A. Michie, Banks and Banking § 154 (1944).
CO In Arnold Tours, Appellant's brief argued:
If the travel agents do not have standing, then national banks could go into the
liquor business, laundry business, used-car business or construction business
without any fear of reprisal.... [This decision] offers a carte blanche to national
banks, a quasi-governmental business, to enter any business they want, irrespective
of authority. . . . Because of the standing obstacle, the Comptroller's arbitrary
decision gains a finality that is unchallengeable. Certainly Congress never intended
unilateral decisions of the Comptroller to have such finality to them. This finality
arises, not because of any legislative expression, but because of a judicially
created theory of self-restraint which was never intended to apply to the instant
situation. 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 22.18, at 291-92.
Brief for Appellant at 24-25, on appeal of Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770
(D. Mass. 1968), to 1st Cir., No. 7192.
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should not be used to determine standing in actions brought under the
National Bank Act, because the test is clearly inapplicable to statutes like
the Act which are intended to protect the public interest.
Thus, the statutory aid test suffers from two basic defects: it necessitates
a judicial determination of congressional intent based upon often ambiguous
and conflicting statements from non-judicial sources; and it provides no
standing for competitors to challenge unlawful competition under statutes
intended to protect the public interest. These two defects should make the
statutory aid test inapplicable in unlawful competition cases under the Na-
tional Bank Act. As a result, the legal right theory of standing, with the
statutory aid concept as its pertinent aspect, is inapplicable to cases under
the Act.
B. The Test of Defendant's Conduct
The legal right theory is inconsistent with the theory of standing that
was applied in Georgia Association. There, the court was not concerned
whether the plaintiff possessed any common law or statutory right which was
violated by the defendant's competition, but it did attempt to determine
whether the defendant had the legal right to engage in the competitive
activity. The court held that an injured party has standing to challenge com-
petition where the challenged party lacks the legal right to perform the
competitive activity.Gi This theory of standing was applied early in Baker,
Watts & Co. v. Saxon. 42
In Baker, Watts, the legality of a Comptroller's ruling permitting na-
tional banks to underwrite securities not backed by the taxing power of a
government entity was challenged. Plaintiffs, investment bankers, were granted
standing to attack the ruling as violating the provision of Section 24, Seventh,
of the National Bank Act which limits the power of banks to underwrite only
general obligations of state or local governments. 63 The court concluded that
the investment bankers had standing to challenge unlawful competition,
that is, competition performed by a person who lacks the legal right or power
to pursue the challenged activity. The court relied upon the "principle" that
permits a person to "restrain the illegal authorization by the government of
an unlawful undertaking." 64 The court distinguished Tennessee Electric and
similar cases which applied the legal right theory of standing because these
involved competition assisted by a loan or grant of government funds whereas
the government in Baker, Watts only authorized the competition 6°
 Because
these cases were distinguishable from Baker, Watts the court was not bound
21 399 F.2d at 1016-17.
62
 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966).
63
 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1964) provides in part:
The limitations and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting
and purchasing for its own account, investment securities shall not apply to
obligations of the United States, or general obligations of any State or of any
political subdivision thereof. .
64 261 F. Supp. at 249; accord, Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381,
388 (8th Cir. 1966).
62 261 F. Supp. at 249.
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to follow the legal right theory and deny standing because the plaintiffs lacked
a legal right.
The theory in Baker, Watts that a competitor has standing to challenge
the legality of competition in which the defendant has no legal right to be
engaged is unacceptable. Under this theory the courts must first decide
whether the activity is unlawful before they can determine whether standing
exists. For example, in Georgia Association the majority first considered the
legality of the Comptroller's ruling authorizing national banks to act as insur-
ance agents and concluded that such activities were contrary to congressional
intent, and, consequently, illegal. Then turning to whether the insurance
agents had standing to bring the suit, the majority decided that they had
standing because the competition was unlawful, and because the insurance
agents had a legal right to be protected from unlawful competition."
The difficulty with this procedure is that deciding whether the activity
is unlawful involves an adjudication of the merits of the substantive issue.
Most frequently, the very question asked the court by the plaintiff is whether
the competitive activity is illegal. It is incongruous for the court to have to
return to the question of standing after having made a determination of the
main issue in the case, because standing has always been a procedural pre-
requisite which must be present before the plaintiff can be heard on the
merits. Indeed, Judge Thornberry, concurring in Georgia Association, criti-
cized the majority for determining the fact of illegality first, and then con-
cluding that standing existed to challenge the unlawful activity, because this
procedure implied that standing depended upon the decision of the sub-
stantive issue.67
The Baker, Watts theory contravenes traditional adjudicative procedure
where standing must be found before the court will enter upon a consideration
of the merits. Hence, to circumvent this problem under the theory of Baker,
Watts, the only reasonable alternative would be to eliminate any requirement
of standing and proceed directly to adjudication of the issue of legality. This
practice would be undesirable because it would leave the courts with no basis
for the determination of the parties entitled to standing. Some tests must
exist for determining standing in order to avoid suits in which the plaintiff has
no legitimate interest in the outcome—suits of a frivolous nature or intended
merely to harass the defendant. Obviously, then, the purpose of standing
will not be achieved by the elimination of that requirement but rather by
the formulation of meaningful standards relevant to those underlying purposes.
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and the rationale of Flast v.
Cohen" provide more meaningful tests by which standing can be determined.
III. MEANINGFUL STANDARDS
A. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
Much of the confusion and inconsistency in the law of standing to sue
under the National Bank Act would be removed if the courts were to interpret
" 399 F.2d at 1016.
67 Id. at 1020 n.3.
Gs 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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correctly Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. That section grants
standing to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute."69
 Under section 10, in order for the plain-
tiff to have standing he would have to show only that he is adversely affected
by the alleged competition resulting from the Comptroller's ruling. The court
would have no need to concern itself with the existence of a common law or a
statutory right in the plaintiff, nor to make a determination of the substantive
issue in the case prior to granting standing.
The crucial words in section 10 are "adversely affected or aggrieved."
Some courts have interpreted these words to mean that in order for the plain-
tiff to have standing he must show that the agency has violated one of his
legal rights." These courts interpret section 10 as adding nothing new to the
law of standing, and "continuing the traditional requirements of standing." 71
This interpretation is incorrect for several reasons. First, section 10, prior to
the "adversely affected" clause, specifically states that persons suffering "legal
wrong because of agency action" shall have standing." If the words "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved" were intended to refer to or describe violations
of existing legal rights they would add nothing to the meaning of the statute
which was not already encompassed in the term "legal wrong."73
 They would
be mere surplusage.
Secondly, the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act
indicates that Congress intended the words "adversely affected" to mean
adversely affected by agency action in fact and not in law. Both the Senate
and the House committee reports on the Act contain the statement: "This
subsection confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected in
fact by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute."T"
Decisions holding to the contrary appear to ignore the usual meaning of the
words "adversely affected in fact" and graft onto section 10 the requirement
that plaintiff possess an established legal right. 75
Finally, several decisions have interpreted statutory language similar to
that of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act as granting standing
to those adversely affected by agency action. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station76
 plaintiff asserted that a Federal Communications Commission grant
of a construction permit for a new radio station would result in economic injury
through competition with his station. He sued to enjoin the FCC from granting
the permit and asserted standing under Section 402(b) (2) of the Communica-
69 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (Supp. III 1965-67).
7 ° E.g., Rural Electrification Admin. v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686
. (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U,S. 945 (1967). Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
71
 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D. Mass. 1968).
72 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III 1965-67).
73
 American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Rd., 112 F. Supp. 346, 349
(D.D.C. 1953).
74 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946).
75
 E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
sub nom. American Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), where standing
under section 10 was made to depend upon the congressional purpose underlying the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, i.e., whether plaintiff had a statutory aid under the Act,
75 309 U.S. 470 (1940) .
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tions Act of 1934, which grants review of agency action to "any other person
aggrieved or whose interests are affected. 777
 The Supreme Court seemed to hold
that when the legislation under which the competitive activity is attacked has
not changed the basic system of competition, for example by creating a monop-
oly, a competitor has standing to challenge administrative action which ad-
versely affects him by creating new competition. 78
 Recognizing that economic
competition alone is never a basis of standing, the Court granted standing on the
ground that Congress may have granted judicial review to competitors under the
Communications Act because it believed that a competitor would be "the
only person having a sufficient interest to bring [the violation] to the attention
of the appellate court.. . . "79
 Thus, because the plaintiff was adversely affected
in fact by the action of the FCC, even though his interest was not a legal
right to be free from competition, it was held that he had standing.
The holding in Sanders is the foundation for a series of subsequent
casesm which have established the theory that plaintiffs representing the
public interest rather than their own private interests should have standing
as private attorneys general. In these cases involving statutes in which Con-
gress has granted judicial review to persons adversely affected by agency
action, the courts have reasoned that Congress intended to give these indi-
viduals standing, as private attorneys general, to challenge allegedly illegal
activities to protect the public interest. For example, in Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC,s' the facts were similar to Sanders; there was competition
with the plaintiff as a result of a decision by the FCC to grant a new station
license. Standing was granted under Section 402 (b) (2) of the Communica-
tions Act. The Supreme Court found that the primary purpose of the Act was
to protect the public interest in communications and that little if any concern
was expressed for the rights of competitors. 82
 Nevertheless, the Court held
that, merely because the plaintiff was a private competitor, the Court was
not compelled to ignore its obligation to protect the public's rights under the
Act. The Court regarded judicial power to protect the public's rights as "not
diminished" by the fact that a private litigant brought the action.83 Under
such circumstances the plaintiff had standing by virtue of the fact that he
represented the public interest. 84
In Associated Indus. v. Ickes85 standing was granted under Section 6(b)
of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 86
 which grants judicial review to "any
person aggrieved" by an agency order. The Secretary of the Interior, pursuant
to the authority vested in him by the Act, promulgated orders which increased
77
 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (b) (6) (1964).
78 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.11 (1958).
79 309 U.S. at 477.
ao E.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) ; FCC v. National
Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239 (1943) ; Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.),
remanded per curiam, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
81 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
82 Id, at 14.
83 Id. at 14-15.
84 Id.
85 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
80 Act of Apr. 26, 1937, ch. 127, § 6(b), 50 Stat. 85.
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the minimum price of coal. Plaintiffs, an organization of coal consumers,
sought judicial review of the orders. Judge Frank, speaking for the court,
pointed out that the statute specifically authorized a particular class of persons
(persons aggrieved) to prevent alleged violations of the Act in the public
interest, even though they could not show a past or threatened invasion of
any legally protected substantive interest of their own. 87 The fact that the
plaintiffs were consumers who were not directly regulated by the statute was
not a detriment to standing, and the fact that the plaintiffs would suffer
financially as a result of the order was sufficient to establish that they would
be aggrieved within the meaning of the Act. 88 The court did not reject the
rule of standing which requires a person to possess a legal right as . a pre-
requisite of standing, but indicated that this rule is inapplicable in situations
where a person is suing under a statute conferring standing on one adversely
affected or aggrieved." Where the statute itself authorizes standing for
persons aggrieved, the doctrine of private attorneys general is applicable
and it is unnecessary to search any further for a basis for standing.
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act has also been interpreted
as broadly as similar statutes have been construed in Sanders and cases sub-
sequent thereto. In American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd.,"
a steamship company sought an injunction to set aside a subsidy granted by
the Federal Maritime Board to two competing shipping companies. The grants
were made pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act" which contained no pro-
visions for judicial review of the Board's actions. The company asserted
standing under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court
held that the injured competitor was adversely affected by the Board's ruling
and therefore had standing to challenge the action under section 10.92 It cited
the holding in Sanders, and based its decision upon the similarity in language
of the Communications Act and the Administrative Procedure Act." More
importantly, the court discussed the effect of the Administrative Procedure
Act on the law of standing. It stated that the Act was not a "mere codifica-
tion" of the preexisting law of standing," and that its purpose was to check
the arbitrary exercise of administrative power by giving injured citizens
recourse to the courts." The court concluded that while no new remedies
were created by the Act, it broadened the scope of judicial review and enlarged
the class of persons entitled to challenge administrative action 4e The theory
requiring a plaintiff to have a legal right was therefore held to be inapplicable
to actions under the Administrative Procedure Act.
87 134 F.2d at 705,
88 Id.; accord, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
80 134 F.2d at 699-705.
an 112 F, Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953).
91 46 U.S.C.	 1171-83(a) (1964).
92 112 F. Supp. at 348-49.
93 Id. at 349.
c°"1 Id.
95 Id.
" Id, For other decisions generally construing the Administrative Procedure Act as
effectively enlarging the scope of judicial review of agency action and, consequently,
increasing the availability of standing, see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967) ; Di Costanzo v. Willard, 165 F. Supp. 533 (D.C.N.Y. 1958).
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The private attorney general doctrine is an effective source of standing
to allege violations of the National Bank Act under Section 10 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. The public interest in a sound credit system
and healthy economy is equally as great as its interest in the other areas in
which the doctrine has been applied. Therefore, the argument for allowing
standing to sue in the public interest is equally compelling in the National
Bank Act cases. Courts which insist upon interpreting the "adversely affected"
provision of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act as requiring a
legal right in the plaintiff seem to ignore the fact that under section 10 and
similar statutory provisions courts have long been granting private competitors
standing, and that standing has been granted upon the theory that such
statutes indicate a congressional intent to empower any individual or class
adversely affected under the statute to sue to prevent violations by govern-
ment officials of their statutory powers." Moreover, the fact that litigants in
unlawful competition suits under the National Banking Act also have a direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome tends automatically to guarantee that the
public interest will be served by a thorough, vigorous and heated litigation
of the issues under the Act.
But even without any theory of private attorneys general being applied,
a simple reading of section 10 and its legislative history indicates that the
prerequisite for standing required by the Act is that a person be adversely
affected in fact by agency action and nothing more. It can be argued that
even when no public interest is involved, a private competitor should have
standing by virtue of the clear language and intent of section 10. Thus, there
appears to be no reason why standing, under the Administrative Procedure
Act, to allege violations of the National Bank Act should not have been
granted in Arnold and Wingate.
B. The Rule of Flast v. Cohen
The effect of employing the Administrative Procedure Act in unlawful
competition cases would be to broaden the availability of standing to allege a
violation of the National Bank Act. This result accords with the recent
Supreme Court decision, Flast v. Cohen,98
 which also increased the avail-
ability of standing to challenge governmental action. There, the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
a federal program involving the expenditure of tax funds for instructional
purposes in religious-affiliated schools." The Court felt that the plaintiff had
established the necessary "nexus" between his status as a taxpayer and the
type of legislative enactment attacked. Specifically, he had established a
logical connection between his status and both the nature of the statute in-
87
 See 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.05 (1958), where it is stated:
No good reason is apparent why the Sanders doctrine, as further developed by
the later cases, should not be of general applicability whenever either the APA
[Administrative Procedure Act] or another statute containing an "adversely
affected" provision is applicable.
98 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
89
 Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Titles I and II of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a)-41(m), 821-27 (Supp. II,
1965-66).
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volved (direct financing of instruction in religious schools) and the clause
under which the unconstitutionality was alleged (the congressional taxing and
spending power).'" Consequently, taxpayers have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal program if the court can find a clear connection
between the status of a taxpayer and both the activity complained of and the
alleged grounds of unconstitutionality.
Flast stated also that the criterion of adverseness should be emphasized
in the determination whether standing existed. Rather than depending upon the
existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, the Supreme Court sought to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to render it a genuine adversary proceeding. It was felt that
this requirement was essential to sharpen the presentation of issues before the
Court, and to assure that they would be vigorously contested by genuinely
interested parties."' Applying this reasoning in his concurring opinion in
Georgia Association, Judge Thornberry concluded that the insurance agents
should have standing because the adverseness of their interests to the al-
legedly illegal competition under the National Bank Act was clear, and the
sufficiency of their personal stake in the outcome of the issue was indisputable. 1 °2
The Flast decision greatly weakens the prohibition against taxpayers'
suits enunciated in Frothingham v. Mellon. 103 Frothingham has served as the
foundation of the theory requiring a person to possess a legal right as a
condition for standing, and the principles laid down in that decision have
shaped the law of standing to such an extent that the legal right theory has
gained firm acceptance.'" Frothingham is the progenitor of cases like Ten-
nessee Electric 105 which have denied standing in the absence of a legal right.
Thus, the impact of Flast has been to weaken the legal right theory of Ten-
nessee Electric by challenging its theoretical underpinning, and to replace
the requirement that plaintiff possess a legal right with the principle that he
need only show a logical connection between his status and the alleged illegal
activity. If it is applied to unlawful competition cases under the National
Bank Act this test would require that the injured competitor demonstrate that
he was suffering financial injury from the competition, and alleged that the
competition was unlawful under the Act. In most cases the competitor would
be able to satisfy the court that he was in fact injured and, hence, he would
have standing.
It is recognized that the holding in Flast goes no further than to estab-
100 392 U.S. at 102-03.
101 The Court stated that standing depends upon whether the plaintiff has
"... alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
392 U.S. at 99.
102 399 F.2d at 1021.
103 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
104 Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.D.C. 1966) ; Saxon v.
Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1020 (5th Cir. 1968) (concurring
opinion of Judge Thornberry).
105 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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lish the requirement of a financial "nexus" in taxpayer suits. 1" However, if
this test is adequate where the plaintiff has no more than a taxpayer's in-
terest in the outcome of the issue, it would seem even more compelling to
apply it to cases where the plaintiff has a more substantial interest, where he
is suffering financial injury directly traceable to allegedly unlawful compe-
tition. Moreover, in cases under the National Bank Act the alleged illegality
stems from federal activities outside the lawful bounds of a statute the con-
stitutionality of which is not questioned. Therefore, if the Supreme Court is
willing to open to this extent the hitherto jealously guarded gates of stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of an act, logically a court should be
even more inclined to allow standing to allege a violation of a constitutional
act. The restrictions on standing to challenge the constitutionality of an act
have always been more severe than those on standing to allege a mere viola-
tion of an act.n7
Flast has reopened consideration of what constitutes standing to allege
unlawful government activity, although it did not go so far as to overrule the
long-standing prohibition against taxpayer suits established in Frothingham.108
Nevertheless, under Flast standing should depend upon the existence of a
logical connection between plaintiff's injury and the alleged illegal activity.
If such a connection is established it will provide the type of genuine adver-
sary interest necessary for a competent judicial resolution of the dispute. It is
submitted that financial injury through competition with banks acting in
violation of the National Bank Act is a sufficient "nexus" under the rule in
Flast to provide injured competitors, such as those in Arnold and Wingate,
with standing to challenge the activity.
CONCLUSION
In unlawful competition cases under the National Bank Act standing has
been denied competitors in many cases in which the courts have employed the
legal right theory because the plaintiff did not possess the necessary common
law or statutory right to be free from competition with banks. In other cases
standing has been granted on the theory that a competitor has standing to
challenge competition resulting from activities which the bank had no legal
right to perform. Neither of these theories provides a valid basis upon which
standing should be determined.
Rather, Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which grants
judicial review to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,"
provides a meaningful test to determine standing to challenge alleged viola-
tions of the National Bank Act. The doctrine of private attorneys general,
which gives private individuals standing to contest violations of statutes in
the public interest, can also be employed to provide standing under Section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act in these National Bank Act cases.
The reasoning of the recent Supreme Court decision in Flast v. Cohen,
that standing exists where the plaintiff demonstrates a nexus between his
status and the nature of the allegedly illegal activity sufficient to provide
1 ° 6 392 U.S. at 102-03.
107 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 338-39 (8th ed. 1927).
108 392 U.S. at 104.
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genuine adversity, is applicable also to unlawful competition cases under the
National Bank Act. The nexus between the injured competitor and the activ-
ity of the bank will usually be clear, and thus result in standing. These tests
for standing eliminate the artificial limitations embodied in the theories now
applied, and serve the public interest by expediting a final determination of
the legality of the bank's activity.
NORMAN G. STONE
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